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Common carriage in the United States today is a patchwork of com-
petition and monopoly. There is enough competition in transportation
so that monopoly power, even in the absence of regulation, could not
be overweening. At the same time, competition is not so complete that
all monopoly power has been effectively checked. In short, the trans-
portation business is neither more nor less competitive than many other
unregulated industries. There are, however, significant features which
set transportation apart from other businesses in this regard.Such
competition as there is in surface transportation is generated largely by
disparate sets of firms each of which has distinctly different propensities
to compete. Where the railroads occupy the supply side of a market by
themselves, competition is practically nonexistent. Where the truckers
or water carriers can enter a market and follow their natural impulses,
competition is practically perfect.
The basic policy decision regarding the economic organization of the
transportation business was made by the Congress some thirty years
ago. At that time Congress had several options. One was to utilize the
competitive forces of the trucking industry to contain railroad mono-
poiy. This would have emphasized the capabilities of the private sector
of the economy to achieve satisfactory resource allocation. Another
was to continue to concentrate decision-making power in its own hands
and in the Interstate Commerce Commission. It is evident that Congress
chose the latter course and in so doing created a class of common carriers352 THECOMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
(the truckers) having few of the intrinsic characteristics of common
carriage as defined in the common law.' The question, which has been
debated over and over again in the years since, is why Congress chose
that alternative and seems to adhere to it so strongly.
The reason most often urged by economists and others is that the
regulated transportation industries comprise a cartel whose interest lies
on the side of moderating competition, and which is willing to accede
to regulation for that purpose. This is undoubtedly an adequate ex-
planation for the support given by much of the trucking industry to
regulation. The railroads, too, are not disposed to open wide the gates
to uncontrolled competition. But this rationale does not explain the
resistance voiced by many interests to a shift toward less regulated
transportation.The "preservation of the common carrier system"
draws wide support and was even alluded to favorably in the President's
transportation message,2 which in general suggested that more com-
petition would be desirable.It is evident that some benefits flow from
the regulation of common carriage which would not be present in a
more competitive milieu. What those benefits are and how universally
they pervade the economy needs to be considered carefully before
changes in public policy are made.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the hypothesis that
public policy toward transportation has evolved largely to encourage a
system in which costs of transportation have been socialized. That is
to say, a public policy which has led to a system in which charges for
transportation (rates) are intended to be related to ability to pay and
not to long-run marginal costs. The exploration can best be done by
considering the mechanism by which socialization has been accom-
plished as well as by inquiring into the objectives of public policy.
If our hypothesis is correct, it is apparent that the value-of-service
rate structure has served in a limited way as a device of income
'A perusal of the history of the common law regarding carriers will show that
much of the legal doctrine in this field was an outgrowth of problems of what we
now call imperfect competition.
2"Forsome seventy-five years, common carriage was developed by the intention
of Congress and the requirements of the public as the core of our transport system.
This pattern of commerce is changing—the common carrier is declining in status
and stature with the consequent growth of the private and exempt carrier. To a
large extent this change is attributable to the failure of federal policies and regulation
to adjust the needs of the shipping and consuming public; to a large extent it is
attributable to the fact that the burdens of regulation are handicapping the certified
common carrier in his efforts to meet his unregulated competition. Whatever the
cause, the common carrier with his obligation to serve all shippers—large or small—
on certain routes at known tariffs and without any discrimination performs an
essential function that should not be extinguished."THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 353
redistribution not unlike the federal income tax. We shall begin by
considering briefly the economics of the problem.
For many years, value-of-service ratemaking has been regarded as a
phenomenon of price discrimination. In conjunction with the economics
of decreasing-cost industries, it has been given a status of economic
respectability which perhaps has inhibited inquiry into its uses for
public policy purposes.
The use of price discrimination as a businessman's technique to
maximize profit has, of course, never turned on the resolution of any
doctrinal conflict over its economic merits. Long before economists
and lawmakers concerned themselves with the problem of rail mono-
poiy, rail management had adopted value-of-service as a precept of
ratemaking. No doubt the prospects of monopoly return were enhanced
by the susceptibility of rail transportation to systematic price discrimi-
nation.This, in turn, may have induced the investment of greater
amounts of private capital in rail plant than would have been forth-
coming had discrimination not been feasible (or lawful).Perhaps
demand and supply relationships in the period following the Civil War
were such that discrimination was essential to induce new investment
or to allow a return on existing plant, or both.
Initially, the bulk of railroad traffic was local and regional.inter-
regional traffic, for which demand at that time was quite elastic, did not
occupy much capacity and could be handled at very little additional
cost. Perhaps the revenues it produced made possible some reduction
in local rates. This was the claim made in Congressional hearings and
debate on the proposed long- and short-haul clause of the Interstate
Commerce Act, where it was argued that uniform distance rates would
kill off long-haul transport and force increases in local rates.3
"Mr. Brown:Probably not more than 1/10th of the freight carried is through
freight over some of the long competing lines.The company cannot afford to
charge the other 9/10th of its freight at the rates charged for the through freight, as
it cannot do so and pay necessary expenses, and if it is prohibited from carrying
1/10th or more of its freight long distances in competition with long through lines, it
prevents those who are located far in the interior from reaching coast cities at all
with their produce, and takes away from the company the small amount of clear
money it realizes on such freight" (17 CongressionalRecord, p.3830, 1886).
"Mr. Brown: Now, Mr. President, with the provision of the bill to which I have
referred [long- and short-haul clause], and especially with the amendment of the
Senator from West Virginia, enacted into a law and strictlycarried out,itisimpossible
for the railroads of this country to transact the business of the country.If they
attempt it they will either be driven into bankruptcy or a large part of the best
territory of the United States will be driven from market and be unable to reach
either Eastern cities or foreign markets with their produce. In other words, the
railroads must put their local freight so low that they cannot pay fixed expenses and
run, or they must put the through business at so high a figure as to prohibit the354 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
Perhaps Congress gave tacit. approval to rate discrimination to
encourage the continued flow of new capital to the railroads or to
assure full utilization of sunk capital.4 Moreover, in its first annual
report the ICC acknowledged both the existence and the merit of value-
of-service rates.5 That position was perhaps wise in view of the Supreme
Court's imminent holding that regulated firms had to be afforded the
opportunity to earn a fair return on the fair value of invested capital.6
As practiced by the railroads, discrimination assumed tw.o basic forms:
discrimination based on the different commodities tendered for ship-
ment and discrimination as between persons and places originating
shipments of competitive commodities.It was clear from the very
beginning of Congressional inquiry into the practices of the rail-
roads that Congress was much more sensitive to the latter form of
discrimination.7 Debate on the act of 1887 centered largely on the
shipment of produce for a longer distance than five or six hundred miles" (ibid., p.
3828).
"Mr. Cullom: ...therigid enforcement of the law as now amended will result
substantially in making a mileage act, so that the nearer a party lives to the seaboard
the cheaper will he get his transportation. It will result, in my opinion, in destroying
much of the commerce of this country" (ibid., p. 4229).
"Mr. Stanford: For this reason rates are oftentimes below the average cost of
transportation, and freight of a low value in the market is often moved at less than
average cost. Low rates, if they pay anything above the direct expenses consequent
upon movement, aid to sustain the railroads and the better enable them to move the
traffic at non-competing points.Railroad companies cannot ignore the various
circumstances that establish competition, much of which depends on the geographi-
cal conditions of the country. The shipper for a short distance has not been charged
more, but the shipper for a long distance is charged less because the carriers cannot
help themselves" (ibid., p. 3827).
"The public interest is best served when the rates are so apportioned as to
encourage the largest practicable exchange of products between different sections of
ourcountryand with foreign countries; and this can only be done by making value
an important consideration, and by placing upon the higher classes of freight some
share of the burden that on a relatively equal apportionment, if service alone were
considered, would fall upon those of less value. With this method of arranging
tariffs little fault is found, and perhaps none at all by persons who consider the
subject from the standpoint of public interest. Indeed, in the complaints thus far
made to the Commission little fault has been found with the principles on which
tariffs for the transportation of freight are professedly arranged, while applications
of those principles in particular cases have been complained of frequently and very
earnestly." First Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, Washington,
D.C., 1887, p. 36.
8Smythev. Ames, 169 US 466 (1898).
"Shippers are willing that the railroads shall receive fair and remunerative
rates; they do not complain so much of the rates as they do of the unfairness of
discriminations that give one section advantages overanother section, one town over
another town, and one set of manufacturers over other manufacturers; that makes
lands in one locality worth more than in another locality less eligibly situated withTHE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 355
discriminatorypractices which affectedcompetitive relationships
between persons and regions,8 and the act as adopted dealt in part with
the problems occasioned by that kind of discrimination.9 It is important
to note that the act of 1887 did not provide for the complete elimination
of either form of discrimination. The propriety of commodity discrim-
ination apparently was recognized1° and, as mentioned above, some dis-
crimination between long- and short-haul freight was tacitly approved.
reference to the markets. And they especially complain to see carloads of the same
kind of freight passing their doors from more distant points to the same markets at
less cost than they pay for transporting the same class of freight to the same market a
less distance" (17Congressional Record, p.3554, 1886).
BOneSenator summarized the complaints against the railroads in this way:
I realize that there have been great wrongs, and I will enumerate some of the
complaints which the people make against the railroad companies of the country
as they have been summed up by the committee in its report:
The complaints against the railroad system of the United States expressed to the
committee are based upon the following charges:
1. That the local rates are unreasonably high compared with through rates.
2. That both local and through rates are unreasonably high at noncompeting
points, either from the absence of competition or in consequence of pooling
agreements that restrict its operation.
3. That rates are established without apparent regard to actual cost of the service
performed, and are based largely on 'what the traffic will bear.'
4. That unjustifiable discriminations are constantly made between individuals in
the rates charged for like service under similar circumstances.
7. That the effect of the prevailing policy of railroad management is, by an
elaborate system of secret special rates, rebates, drawbacks, and concessions,
to foster monopoly, to enrich favored shippers, and to prevent free competition
in many lines of trade in which the item of transportation is an important factor.
8. That such favoritism and secrecy introduce an element of uncertainty into
legitimate business that greatly retards the development of our industries and
cornmerce.
16. That the capitalization and bonded indebtedness of the roads largely exceed
the actual cost of their construction or their present value, and that unreason-
able rates are charged in an effort to pay dividends on watered stock and
interest on bonds improperly issued.
18. That the management of the railroad business is extravagant and wasteful,
and that a needless tax is imposed upon the shipping and traveling public by
the unnecessary expenditure of large sums in the maintenance of a costly
force of agents engaged in a reckless strife for competitive business" (17 Con-
gressional Record, p.3869, 1886).
See 24 Stat. 379, 380 (1887), 49 USC, Sees. 2 and 3 and amendments thereto.
10Thiswas made explicit by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. See 35 Stat. 60(1910),
49 USC Sec. 1(6). This provision makes it the duty of regulated carriers to establish,
observe, and enforce just and reasonable classifications.This recognition of the
classification principle amounts to recognition of the practice of class rate discrimi-
nation. In a recent case the Commission argued that Sec. 1(6) makes classification
and class (value-of-service) rates a mandatory not permissive principle of ratemaking.
This argument was rejected by a three-judge District Court (see N.Y., N.H., and
H.R.R. Co. v. U.S., 32 U.S. Law Week(p. 2081, U.S. District Court, Conn.,
Civil Action 9229, 7/23/63).356 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
Clearly regional considerations were involved.Benefits from both
forms of discrimination ran largely to the South and West, and
Congressmen from those regions, though strong supporters of the act,
would not have wished regulation to deprive their constituents of the
benefits.
In the years between the Civil War and World War I, the economy
of the West was largely undeveloped and the demand for transportation
was probably quite elastic.Reduced rates on western produce were
probably in the railroad's interest.It is doubtful that the interstate
Commerce Act was supposed to limit the railroads' power to continue
discrimination in such cases.This is not to say, however, that the
carriers and the Commission were of one mind as to how the railroads
might utilize their power. Although the Commission did not act to
eliminate all forms of discrimination, it did begin to develop standards
covering the amount and kind of discrimination permissible. The basic
rule articulated by the Commission in this early period was that no rate
should be more than what the service was reasonably worth—worth
being measured by some criterion other than what the traffic would
bear." In applying this stricture, though staying within the bounds of
Smythe v. Ames, the Commission tended to limit rate increases on
agricultural products and raw materials while being less restrictive in
the treatment of proposed increases on manufactured goods.12 That
policy might have reflected a Congressional disposition to resist rail
rate increases which might have slowed the rate of growth of the
extractive industries in the West.
The modern history of rail ratemaking began with economic changes
ushered in by World War I. By 1920 the demand for rail transportation
probably had increased, relative to existing plant, so that nondis-
criminating pricing might have been required without danger of
crippling the railroads financially.'3 The war had greatly expanded the
flow of interregional traffic and induced firms to make locational
commitments in areas distant from many markets. Changes on the
supply side of transportation had also taken place.Rail plant and
11SeeR. R. Commission of Nevada v.So.Pac. Co. 191CC 238, 249 (1910); and
Advances in Rates—Western Case 201CC 307, 349—351, 354—357 (1911).
12See1. L. Sharfrnan (The interstate Commerce Commission, Vol. III B, New
York, 1936, pp. 45—83), discussing the 5 Per Cent Case of 1914 and the Rate Advance
Case of 1915.In the former case, the Commission allowed eastern railroads to
increase most rates by 5 per cent;in the latter case western roads were denied
increases on raw materials and agricultural products. See also 311CC 351 (19.14),
and 351CC 497 (1915). "Anoptimistic view of the railroads' futureis expressedby W. Z. Ripley, Main
Street and Wall Street, Boston, 1927, Chap. VIII.THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 357
capacityhad diminished as a result of extensive deterioration during
the war years. This allowed the railroads some flexibility of supply,
in the sense that a reinvestment program could have been geared to
revenues from alessdiscriminatory (or nondiscriminating) rate
structure. Of course, a move to lessen the pattern of discrimination in
rail rates might have slowed the rate of investment in rail plant in the
1920's and might have curtailed rail service to some shippers. The
latter development probably would have resulted in higher rates on. the
movement of products of the extractive industries and less extensive
service to and from areas that generated low volumes of traffic.It is
doubtful that Congress would have favored such a development.
Flligher rates on agricultural products might have been absorbed by
the farmer owing to inelasticity in the supply of such commodities.
That would have worsened the already depressed state of agriculture
and agricultural land values, a condition which history has demon-
strated to be unpalatable to Congress.
Whatever possibilities of reducing discrimination might have resulted
from expansion of demand for transportation, shifts in the location of
economic activity, and diminution of rail plant can only be surmised.
In the postwar period Congress clearly favored the preservation of the
value-of-service rate structure.
The Transportation Act of 1920 established fair return on fair value
as the rule of ratemaking to be followed by the ICC.'4 In 1924 the
Supreme Court expunged any notion that full cost was the upper limit
for measuring the reasonableness of any individual rate.'5 So inter-
preted, the act of 1920 imposed no cost ceiling on particular rates.
Given the assurance that public policy condoned discrimination, the
railroads tailored their investment programs accordingly. The ICC
cooperated by not discouraging rail plant expansion, partly because its
powers respecting such matters are limited, but also because Congress
clearly favored the expansion of transportation facilities.
We do not mean to assert that there may not have been (and perhaps
still are) rigidities in rail plant which called for some measure of dis-
crimination in rail pricing. The point here is merely that the lessening
of discrimination was not espoused by Congress or the Commission as
an objective of public policy. Succeeding developments in the 1920's
made it clear that other objectives were desired.
The railroads interpreted the act of 1920 as giving them freedom to
maximize wherever possible, subject tp the fair return constraint.
"41 Stat. 488 (1920); as subsequently amended 49 USC 15 (a).
Dayton—Goose Creek Ry. v.U.S.,263 US 456 (1924).358 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
Pursuing this premise, they attempted to level up the generally depressed
eastbound rates on the products of agriculture and the extractive
industries. Western roads, particularly, found that the opportunities
to increase revenues lay largely in the business of carrying raw materials
and agricultural products, commodities which traditionally had moved
at low rates. Increases in these rates were also justified by changes in
rail-cost relationships.It is virtually certain that the balance of trans-
continental rail traffic shifted from westbound to eastbound, so that
car shortages occurred in the West and empty cars moved westward.
Responding to these conditions the railroads began to level up the rates
on eastbound movements.
The Commission began to balk at these efforts of the carriers to alter
historic rate relationships which had existed practically from the
inception of regulation.It reiterated its position that no rate should
exceed what the service is reasonably worth, and in the 1920's it began
to hold down or even require reductions in rates on various eastbound
movements.'6 Thus, the Commission rejected the railroads' contention
that the rule of ratemaking should be interpreted to allow the railroads
full latitude as to the most efficient use of the discriminating rate
structure, subject only to the fair-return ceiling.
That action was significant, since it revealed the Commission's view
of its role in rate cases. In spite of the apparent primacy of the fair-
return criterion in ratemaking, it is clear that the Commission would
not allow the railroads to set rates in a way which would disturb
important regional relationships. These conflicts between the carriers
and the Commission appear to be inevitable consequences of demand
pricing.Rates based on ability to pay, whether determined by the
Commission or by the carriers, must look to both the immediate and
the ultimate effect of the rate.It is clear that the two can be quite
different, that the Commission and the carriers may evaluate them
differently, and that such differences can reflect the economic impact
of the rate. Even so, disagreements between Commission and carrier
can be interpreted simply as differences in time preference (that is, the
period over which revenues are maximized), and as evidence that the
Commission is really only serving the long-run interest of the carriers.
This interpretation ignores the fact that, while value-of-service rates
may look to the maximizing of revenues and service, they are not
"neutral" to the economy. Demand pricing clearly must gauge the
effect of a rate on the firm or industry to which the rate applies. In
See 68 ICC 676 (1922): 113 ICC 3(1926); and Sharfman, The Interstate Corn-
rnerce Commission, pp. 160—161.THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 359
that sense, the Commission must decide which sector or segment of
the economy is likely to grow, or decline, as a result of change in trans-
portation charges.It may appear, however, that the Commission has
gone further in estimating the revenue consequences of a rate to the
point of deciding which industries should receive the benefit of favorable
rates.If such is the case, the conflicts between the carriers and
the Commission are not similar to those between the manager
and the members of the cartel as to the way to maximize the returns
to the cartel; they are instead conflicts between an economic planner
and the firms subject to its control as to how these firms are to provide
service consistent with the plan. There is ample evidence to support
the proposition that the Commission has been authorized to perform
such a function.
Perhaps the first legislative directive to the Commission to undertake
economic planning because of the impact of transportation rates came
in 1925. Depressed conditions in agriculture had persisted in the years
immediately following World War I.These conditions stimulated
Congress to give the Commission explicit instructions regarding its
role in rate cases. Western Congressmen urged the adoption of a joint
resolution which would specify that agriculture, "the basic industry of
the country," 17shouldbe afforded favorable treatment in rail rate-
making. The proposal provoked long and acrimonious debate, but
finally emerged in modified form as the Hoch-Smith Resolution.'8
It gave explicit guidance to the Commission to regulate rates so that
"...theconditions which at any time prevail in our several industries
should be considered insofar as it is legally possible to do so, to the
end that commodities may freely move." 19
17 68thCong., 1stsess.,S.Rept.313,"Declaring Agriculture to be the Basic
Industryof the Country, and For Other Purposes," Mar. 28, 1924. Mr. Smith from
the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce: "This joint resolution is for
the purpose of declaring the policy of the Congress as to freight rates on agricultural
products and directing the Interstate Commerce Commission to carry this policy
into effect.
"Congress having declared to the ICC the power to make rates, it was thought
unwise to attempt to dictate any specific rate, but to direct the Commission that in
the exercise of its ratemaking power the products of agriculture should carry the
lowest rate in the rate structure. This is because the products of agriculture are the
prime essentials in the economic structure of organized society. These products are
produced under circumstances thatdonot permit the producer to pass the charges
incident totheirmarketing to the consumer.
"The agriculturist pays the freightuponwhat he buys and sells.Itseems, there-
fore, but just that provision should be made to make this burden as light as possible,
especially upon the things he produces."
43 Stat. 801 (1925); 49 USC Sec. 55.
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Furthermore, the resolution authorized and directed the Commission
to make a thorough investigation of the rate structure to determine to
what extent:
existing rates and charges may be unjust, unreasonable, unjustly
discriminatory, or unduly preferential, thereby imposing undue burdens, or
giving undue advantage as between the various localities and parts of the
country, the various classes of traffic, and the various classes and kinds of
commodities, and to make, in accordance with law, such changes, adjust-
ments, and redistribution of rates and charges as may be found necessary to
correct any defects so found to exist. In making any such change, adjustment,
or redistribution the Commission shall give due regard, among other factors,
to the general and comparative levels in market value of the various classes
and kinds of commodities as indicated over a reasonable period of years to a
natural and proper development of the country as a whole, and to the
maintenance of an adequate system of transportation.2°
The resolution gave particular emphasis to agriculture:
In view of the existing depression in agriculture, the Commission is hereby
directed to effect with the least practicable delay such lawful changes in the
rate structure of the country as will promote the freedom of movement by
common carriers of the products of agriculture affected by that depression,
including livestock, at the lowest possible lawful rates compatible with the
maintenance of adequate transportation service.21
The Hoch-Smith Resolution is the first and only explicit legislative
sanction of value-of-service ratemaking. Taken literally, the resolution
seems to require the Commission to adhere to the discriminatory rate
structure which had been characteristic of rail pricing. At the very
least, the resolution stiffened the Commission's resolve to protect the
value-of-service rate structure and the historic preference in the rates
afforded to agriculture. In attempting to carry out the Congressional
mandate, the Commission even sought to widen the spectrum of rates
in order to afford greater concessions to shippers of agricultural
products.22 When that threatened to reduce the revenues of the
carriers, they appealed to the courts for relief, contending that the rule
of ratemaking of 1920 made the revenue needs of the railroads the
prime consideration in rate cases and that Hoch-Smith had not altered
that rule. The case ultimately reached the Supreme Court where the
railroads carried the day. The court held that the resolution had made
2043Stat. 801 (1925); 49 USC Sec. 55.
21Ibid.
22See,generally, Sharfrnan, The Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 740—744.THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 361
no change in the law regarding ratemaking but had merely made
explicit the legality of value of service as a ratemaking
The Court's decision in the Ann Arbor case nullified some rate re-
ductions which the Commission had imposed, and affirmed the con-
tention that the rule of ratemaking of 1920 had not been altered by the
resolution.The court found that the resolution expressed certain
hoped-for objectives which the Commission should seek to achieve
but within the limits of the law, including the rule of fair return on fair
value.24
Certain language used in the Ann Arbor opinion gives the impression
that the Court did not view the Hoch-Smith Resolution as having
affected any change in the law,25 and that view has been adopted by
numerous commentators.26 A closer reading of the case shows that it
is true only in part. As interpreted by the court, the resolution had not
changed the rule of ratemaking of 1920. Fair return on fair value was
still the overriding requirement of that rule. Nor did the resolution
make lawful anything that was not lawful prior to its adoption, value of
service having been an established principle of ratemaking since the
very inception of regulation. The resolution did, however, make one
very significant change in the law and in the relationship between
Congress and the Commission. The resolution was an assertion of the
legislative power to establish standards in ratemaking and in so doing
diminish the independence of the Commission in that regard.27 The
resolution also made explicit that value-of-service ratemaking was not
23AnnArbor Ry. Co. v. U.S. 281 U.S. 658 (1930).
24Ibid., 658, 669. Thisview is supported by the statements of both sponsors of
the resolution in the debate on it: "Mr. Smith: It is simply a direction to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission that whenever, there is a depression in any of the basic
industries of the United States, as there has been in agriculture, the Commission
should take cognizance thereof, and regulate the rates so as to facilitate the move-
ment of the products of that industry (65 Congressional Record, p. 8336, 1924).
"Mr, Hoch: ... andthere isnoprovision here and no requirement or expectation
that any rate which is not compensatory shall be levied" (ibid.; p. 11026).
Ann Arbor Ry. Co. V.U.S.,p. 668.
26SeeD. P. Locklin, The Economics of Transportation, 5th ed., Homewood,
Ill., 1960, pp. 239—241.
27Sharfmanhas criticized the Hoch-Smith Resolution as fundamentally wrong
and in breach of the principle of the independent status of the Commission (Sharfman,
The Interstate Commerce Commission, pp. 469—472). He characterizes the resolution
as "an attempt to override the judgment of the Commission. .. andto' recognize
the special demands of dissatisfied litigants and their supporters through the
exertion of political power" (p. 470).
The authors of this paper do not hold.a similar view regarding the propriety of
such uses of political, power. In our view, public policy is in large part an ex-
pression of political power and as such need not conform to the value system of
economics or any other discipline in order to remain in the realm of propriety.362 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
only permissible but was required, insofar as that principle is consistent
with other aspects of the law. The rule of ratemaking has since been
changed by Congress28 and the federal courts have largely abandoned
the rule of Smythe v. Ames.29 The Hoch-Smith Resolution stands
unaltered and its directives are still a viable part of the ratemaking
law.3°
When Congress elected to adhere to value-of-service ratemaking in
the 1920's this perhaps prevented shifting to a less discriminatory rate
structure. We have indicated above that the Commission might well
have brought about such a change without any danger of disabling the
carriers financially.By forestalling that development, the Congress
effectively postponed a re-evaluation of the efficacy of value-of-service
rates for another two decades.
The depression of the 1930's came close on the heels of a significant
expansion of rail plant and railroad debt obligations. The high level
of plant capacity and fixed charges built up in the 1920's was not
appropriate to the demand conditions of the depression years.The
imminent financial collapse of many carriers made necessary endeavors
to secure revenues from every source possible.Presumably, the
continuance of discrimination in rates could have enhanced the earnings
of the railroads in that era. However, the difficulties of the railroads
were not solely a product of the depression. Truck transportation had
developed into a serious competitor during the twenties and had
diverted much traffic from the rails. The bulk of the traffic that shifted
from rail to highway was high-value, high-rated manufactured goods,
the "cream of the transportation business." The existence of effective
competition on a fairly wide scale made difficult the maintenance and
manipulation of the value-of-service rate structure in aid of the financial
plight of the railroads. The roads thus had to look to traffic in which
truck competition was less effective as a possible source of new revenue.
The traffic which offered the greatest promise for increased revenue
was agricultural products. The inelasticities of supply in these goods
were probably of such an order that increases in freight rates would not
have reduced substantially the volume of shipment, and the increased
cost would have been absorbed largely by the farmer, at least in the
short run.Proposed increases in these rates met with immediate
9848Stat. 220 (1933); subsequently amended 49 USC Sec. 15 (a)(2).
29F.P. C. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 US 575 (1942), and F. P. C. ii.I-lope
Natural Gas Co., 320 US 591 (1944).
Apparently the Commission has held to this view.See 248 ICC 545, 611
(1942); 300 ICC 633, 686 (1957);citedby Locklin TheEconomics of Transportation,
p.421.THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 363
opposition. The Congress found intolerable the prospect of freight-rate
increases which would worsen the economic disaster facing agriculture.
As a palliative measure the Congress repealed the rule of ratemaking
of 1920 by an amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act.3' The
amended rule directed the Commission to regulate rates, so that
traffic would move freely at the "lowest charges consistent with the cost
of providing service." 32Therevenue needs of the carriers were to be
considered to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of adequate
transportation service. Fair return on fair value was abandoned as the
prime objective of ratemaking. Under the new rule, the public need
for cheap and adequate transportation was the prime consideration
and the revenue need of the carriers was a subsidiary factor to be
considered insofar as necessary to achieve the prime objective of
public service. The amendment revitalized the 1-loch-Smith Resolution
which the Commission then used frequently to justify its attempts to
maintain wide disparities in the rate structure.33
The act of 1933 was but a stopgap measure. The railroads were in
desperate need of more revenue.Increases at the top of the rate
structure were largely barred by truck competition, while increases on
lower-rated goods were resisted by the Commission in accord with the
new ratemaking policy.If value-of-service rates and the preferential
rates at the low end of the rate spectrum were to be preserved, additional
steps had to be taken. In the Commission's view the key was regulation
of truck transportation,34 since the diversion of high-rated traffic to
truck movement was depriving the railroads of the traffic which
supported the value-of-service structure. Such regulation was effected
in 1935 with the adoption of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act.
The support for the act of 1935 came from a coalition of interests,
including large truckers who desired some modification of price com-
petition, shippers who favored rate stabilization, and public officials
who advocated a "clean-up" of the trucking business. However, for
many congressmen the important thing was to do something to help
the railroads.35Predictions made on the floor of both houses that
regulation would lead to higher truck rates were not seriously denied.36
In line with that admission, and to appease those who feared increases
41Stat. 488 (1933); as subsequently amended 49 USC Sec. 15 (a) (2).
32Ibid.
See note 24.
See "The Fifteen Per Cent Case of 1931," 178 ICC 539, 582 (1931).
See 79Congressional Record, pp. 12197,12210, 12214 (1935).
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on rates for agricultural commodities, movements of such commodities
were exempted from regulation under Part
Public regulation of truck transportation has not received much
support from economists—and this is not surprising. Freed of regu-
lation, the business of truck transportation would probably come as
close to the model of pure competition as is possible in the real world.
The regulation of this business has been described as a cartel arrange-
ment joining the interests of railroads and truckers under a common
manager, the ICC.38But perhaps truck regulation may be better
explained in broader terms. For example, it is clear that if, by the act of
1935, Congress sought to help the railroads, it was not solely out of
concern for their employees and owners. Help for the railroads meant
preservation of the rail pricing system and retention of depressed rates
on some commodities.Truck competition clearly threatened the
viability of that price structure and, if allowed to persist, would have
necessitated the increase of some rail rates.Control of truck com-
petition through regulation may have held out the prospect of helping
the railroads, and no doubt railroad lobbying aided in the passage of
the Motor Carrier Act but, nevertheless, chief among the confluence of
interests which brought about passage of the act was pressure from
certain shippers and representatives of certain regions to retain the
benefits of value-of-service rates.
The ICC did not misunderstand the significance of the Motor Carrier
Act.It gave immediate approval to truck rates and classifications
which were almost exact duplicates of rail rates and classifications.
Moreover, in the early days of 1935, the Commission made use of the
minimum rate power to level up truck rates.39
Water competition, however, continued to harass the railroads. In
order to have greater freedom to cope with it, the railroads suggested
to Congress that the long- and short-haul clause be repealed, but the
Senate was not receptive. Instead, Senator Wheeler, Chairman of the
Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, proposed that
Congress bring water transportation under regulation of the Interstate
Commerce Commission.4°
Perhaps as a result of Senator Wheeler's suggestion, the Trans-
portation Act of 1940 began as a bill to bring all domestic water
49 Stat. 544 (1935);as subsequently amended 49USC Sec.303(b) (4a),(5), (6).
See S. P. Huntington, "The Marasmus of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission," 61 Yale Law Journal 465 (1952). "SeeFifth Class Rates Between Providence and Boston 2 MCC 530, 547—549
(1936); Rates Over Carpet City Trucking 4 MCC 589 (1938); Commodity Rates
of Kolahoma and Texas Transfer Co. 6 MCC 259 (1936).
4084Congressional Record, 1939, pp. 5874, 5882, and 6149.THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 365
transportation,except the noncontiguous trades, under regulation by
the ICC, including much that up to that point had not been regulated
at all. The bill, debated through three sessions of Congress, encountered
much opposition from water-minded Congressmen, especially from the
South. In order to prevent selective rate cutting by the railroads which
might harass the water carriers, Senator Miller of Arkansas and
Congressman Wadsworth of New York introduced an amendment
which would have forced the carriers to comply with some kind of cost
floor for rates. The amendment stated:
In order that the public at large may enjoy the benefit and economy
afforded by each type of transportation the Commission shall permit each
type of carrier or carriers to reduce rates so long as rates maintain a compen-
satory return to the carrier or carriers after taking into consideration over-
head and all the elements entering into the cost to the carrier or carriers for
the service rendered.It shall be unlawful to establish rates for any type of
transportation which shall not be compensatory, as herein defined, whether
such rates are established to meet competition of other types of transportation
or for other purposes.41
Initially, the amendment met little opposition. In the debate on it,
Senator Wheeler suggested that the language in the last sentence of the
amendment might have an adverse impact on some water carriers,
particularly those operating on the Great Lakes. Consequently, the
last sentence of the original amendment was deleted and in that form
the amendment was passed by the Senate.42
An amendment identical with the Miller Amendment was introduced
in the House by Congressman Wadsworth of New It met
substantial opposition at the outset, but was passed.44 Then, despite
initial agreement by both houses on the Miller-Wadsworth Amendment,
the conference committee refused to report a bill containing it.In
debate on the conference report, Congressman Wadsworth moved
that the bill be resubmitted to conference and the House conferees be
instructed to insist on adoption of the Wadsworth Amendment.45
That motion was passed and the bill resubmitted to conference.46 A
second conference report was presented to the House and once again
the Wadsworth Amendment was deleted.47 Mr. Wadsworth moved to






ibid., p.10146.366 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
resubmit the bill to conference with instructions that the Wadsworth
Amendment be adopted.48 That motion was defeated.49
Opposition to the Miller-Wadsworth Amendment developed during
the prolonged debate, as individual Congressmen recognized that the
adoption of the amendment could signal a profound change in trans-
portation policy. Their remarks and declamations provide an excep-
tionally revealing record of Congressional opinion about the objectives
of transportation regulation.5°The gist of the controversy asit
48Ibid., p.10192.
ibid., p.10193.
Mr.Wheeler:"if the Miller-Wadsworth Amendment should be adopted, it
would make every railroad company in this country, if a question of rates was
raised, increase its rates on every branchilne railroad. Not only that, but the
Wadsworth Amendment provides that the Commission is to permit a floor to be
placed under rates.It must be compensatory and in addition it must cover all
overhead and all allowances of costs, meaning overhead, including taxes. There is
considerable freight in this country that is carried at a low level of freight rates on a
narrow margin because of competitive conditions or because it would not move at
a higher freight rate. Many agricultural commodities are in this category, as are
passenger fares" (86 CongressionalRecord, p.11290, 1940).
Mr. Lea: "... Wehave an average cost of freight in this country. Much of it
is hauled below that cost. Much freight is above that average cost.
"The Wadsworth Amendment states that the Commission shall permit the
freight to be placed at a certain elevation.It must be compensatory and, in
addition to that it must cover overhead and all elements of cost. That means over-
head, including taxes. Without including any return on the investment we have
this situation. Assume that the figure 100involveswhat the Wadsworth Amend-
ment states shall be included, compensation, including overhead, and it would
carry taxes. The statistics show that in this country the average cost of trans-
portation would be less than 80 percent of the Wadsworth standard, that is,
what is rated as transportation cost. The additional costs are necessary of course
for overhead and taxes.
"There is much freight at the present time that is carried as low as 80, under
100, because of competitive conditions or because it will not move at a higher
freight rate.Cheap freight—low-grade freight like grain, fertilizer, sand and
gravel, and building materials—must move at the lower level on a narrow margin
or they do not move at all.Therefore the effect of the Wadsworth Amendment
would be to require this 100 percent instead of the 80-percent floor on which the
freight-rate structure is founded.
"The effect of this amendment, if put into practical effect and enforced, would
be to raise the freight rates on a large portion of the heavy commerce of the
United States.
"The high-cost freight, the high-priced freight, makes possible the low-cost
freight in the United States. For instance, here is a passing train. One car is
loaded with building materials. The railroad hauls that at a very low margin.
Next to that car is a carful of merchandise, dry goods. The car that is loaded
with dry goods probably pays $200 for the trip, while the car loaded with building
materials pays $100. The high price that is charged for the higher grade freight makes
it possible for the railroad to make something for carrying the low-grade freight. It
carries the low-grade freight at a very minimum of profit, but its income is some-
thing above what it would have been had it not carried that freight" (ibid.,p.18178).THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS 367
unfolded was that a shift to a system of rates based on cost would result
in increased rates on the movement of raw materials and agricultural
products, and that this would not be in accord with past policy that
such commodities should move at rates as low as possible.The
clarification of that issue probably explains the ultimate defeat of the
Miller-Wadsworth Amendment.
The result of the ratemaking controversy in the debate on the
Transportation Act of 1940 cannot be construed as other than Con-
gressional approval of value-of-service rates. Moreover, the Record is
persuasive that the opponents of the amendment were more concerned
with the retention of low rates on some commodities than with improve-
ment in the level of rail revenues.5' However, the statement of national
policy in the act of 1940 does embody Congressional recognition that
the carriers must be compensated if service is to be continued, viz., the
emphasis on fostering sound economic conditions in transportation
and the proscription of unfair and destructive competition.52 The task
of carrying out these policy directiveshas, of course,fallen on
the ICC.
About the time of the debate on the act of 1940, the Commission was
developing a uniform rate scale and uniform classification. If the Miller-
Wadsworth Amendment had been adopted, the class rate case probably
would not have been continued. In a sense the act of 1940 and the
evolution of the class rate structure were mutually confirming, and after
1940 the Commission proceeded with its refinement of an intricate
value-of-service structure of class rates.
In the post—World War II period, the Commission found itself
administering an internal subsidy in both rail and truck transportation.
Regulation of truck transportation may have moderated the inherently
competitive nature of the industry. Nevertheless, competitive pressures,
though blunted, still made themselves felt in service. This competition,
which the Commission has difficulty in controlling, probably squeezed
out at least some of the internal subsidy which otherwise might have
lodged in the truck rate structure. But even so, shippers concerned
about competitive rate relationships in large degree achieved the effect
of subsidy by rate equalization, and did not give up a great deal (i.e.,
compared to subsidized shippers by rail), inasmuch as service com-
petition often does little more than dissipate carrier revenue. In that
sense, small-lot shippers in sparse traffic areas have been benefited by
Seefootnote 50.
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regulation and the extended service encouraged under it. Without it,
their competitive positions would be worsened.53
Although it is not likely that the proponents of the acts of 1935 and
1940 envisioned this result for trucking, the Commission apparently
found in the statement of policy of the act of 1940 a basis for such a
result.It is true that the supporters of 1CC regulation of truck and
water transportation had stressed the destructively competitive effects
of these modes on rail transportation and rail rates.54Those who
opposed the extension of regulation to the other modes expressed
their fear that regulation by the ICC would mean that truck and barge
rates would be held up to protect the railroads.55
Various provisions were included in the act to allay these fears. The
statement of national policy refers to the preservation of the inherent
advantages of each mode as a goal of regulation56 and, in the revised
rule of ratemaking, the Commission was admonished to consider the
effect of proposed rates on the movement of traffic "by the carrier or
carriers for which the rates are prescribed." The statement of policy
also directs the Commission to "...providefor fair and impartial
regulation of all modes...;to promote safe, adequate, economical,
and efficient service and foster sound economic conditions in trans-
portation and among the several carriers;... allto the end of devel-
oping, coordinating, and preserving a national transportation system
by water, highway, and rail. .."Considering this language and
assurances made by Senator Wheeler that the act would require the
See the letter to Hon. John Sparkman, Chairman, Select Committee on Small
Business, United States Senate, from J. H. Fles, executive vice president of Asso-
ciated Truck Lines, Inc., Grand Rapids, Michigan, July 1, 1957 (Printed in Trucking
Mergers and Concentration Hearings Before theSelect Committee on Small Business,
United States Senate, 85th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1957, pp. 161—162).
"Relaxation of rate policy will also mean that the shipper in the small com-
munity will not be given the service and the freight rates offered to shippers
located in dense areas shipping to other dense areas. If free entry of transportation
were allowed with a relaxed rate policy on the part of State and Federal regulatory
bodies, Associated would give up many small service communities immediately
because they are costing us money. Under our grant of authority, we are forced
to serve such areas, and part of the price level granted by the Commission makes
it possible to do so. Thus the lowest possible rate for a given shipper is not
necessarily good for the country. We know the Interstate Commerce Commission
seeks the lowest possible uniform rates so that shippers can obtain reasonably
low transportation costs without discrimination" (sic).
"Thisposition was summarized by Senator Wheeler at the time he introduced the
bill which ultimately became the act of 1940 (84 CongressionalRecord, 1939,pp.
5869,5870,5873, 5874).
See statements by Senator Bailey and Congressman South, 84 Congressional
Record, 1939,pp. 6134 and 9716.
5654Stat. 899 (1940); 49 USC preceding Sec. I.
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Commission to treat all modes impartially,58 it is not surprising that the
Commission has protected the truck rate structure as well as the rail,
and has permitted or required rates which allowed the expansion of
truck and barge service.59
The task of administering the policy impartially to preserve the
inherent advantages of each mode and to foster sound and economical
transportation was obviously difficult.Preserving the value-of-service
rate structure requires that some freight yield revenues substantially
greater than the cost of service.If both truck and rail carriers are to
provide subsidized service, each must have a share of high-rated
freight.But the Commission's efforts to protect the value-of-service
structure, while dividing the traffic between modes, began to have
adverse effects on the railroads. As volume carriers, the railroads'
prime competitive weapon is price. The truckers, on the other hand,
rely primarily on their service advantages to attract business. To
achieve a satisfactory division of traffic between modes, the rates for
each mode must reflect a balance between cost and service factors.
Such a balance is not easily struck. The Commission tended to hold
to the existing pattern of rate relationships and to avoid selective rate
changes. This tended to give an advantage to the truckers. Moreover,
the Commission was apparently reluctant to yield to the rate-cutting
inclinations of the railroads because of the potentially devastating effects
it could have on the truckers. At reduced rail rates, the truckers could
probably continue to compete with the railroads in dense traffic areas,
but at reduced revenue levels.This, in turn, would tend to eliminate
trucking service to small shippers and to areas of lesser traffic volume,
which would force rate increases for such shippers or areas. Similarly,
if the truckers attempted to lower their rates to meet rail rate reductions,
the railroads might not experience a net increase in revenue on their
truck competitive movements and this, in turn, could lead to rate
increases on their nontruck competitive traffic, much of which is the
heavy agricultural and raw materials movements on which low rates
are desired. As a result, the Commission often found such proposed
rate changes, either truck or rail, to be destructively competitive and in
violation of national policy.60
See 84Congressional Record, p. 6073 (1939).
PetroleumProducts Inc., Illinois Territory, 2801CC 681, 691 (1951). Petroleum
Carriers Division v.A.,T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 302 ICC 243 (1957) (rail-truck competi-
tion). Wire Rods, Galveston Tex. & Sterling III., 277 ICC 123 (1950). Aluminum
Articles, Texas to Ill, and Iowa, 293 ICC 467, 472 (1954) (rail-barge competition).
GOSeePetroleum Products Inc., Illinois Territory, 280 ICC 681, 691 (1951).
Sugar from Houston, Texas, 51 MCC 775, 781 (1950).Merchandise in Mixed
Truckloads, East 62 MCC 699, 723 (1954); 63 MCC 453, 483 (1955)Petroleum
Carriers Division v.A.,T., & S.F. Ry. Co. 302 ICC 243, 254—255 (1951).370 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
The Commission's attemptsresolve these problems have been
further complicated in recent years. Much of the high-rated traffic over
which the railroads and the truckers have squabbled has been slipping
away from the common carrier system and moving instead by exempt
carriage.Legitimate private carriage has increased greatly and, of
course, opportunities for profit have induced a fringe of illegitimate
operations in truck transportation. The Transportation Act of 1958
has also introduced another unsettling element into an already confused
situation. The 1958 amendment to the rule of ratemaking instructed
the Commission that:"Rates of carriers shall not be held up to a
particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of trans-
portation.•"61How this is to be reconciled with the statement of
national policy in the act of 1940 is not clear. The one test of this
provision by the Supreme Court came out of a Commission attempt
to hold up rates on a piggyback movement in order to protect a water
carrier. The Court reversed the Commission's order and stated that,
in a case where a proposed rail rate was fully compensatory, the
Commission could prevent the adoption of that rate only if it could
demonstrate, with satisfactory evidence, that the rate change was
prohibited by national transportation policy.62 Thus, the Commission
is faced with the task of balancing competing interests of various modes
of common carriage, which are subject to increasing competition from
unregulated carriage, while seeking guidance from potentially irrecon-
cilable provisions in the law.
A solution to this problem may be found in proposed revisions of
the law.However, shipper interests are not neutral in the struggle
among the modes, and between common and unregulated carriage.
Many stand to gain if the regulated structure should be altered so as to
allow greater competition in ratemaking. Others stand to lose a great
deal. Generally, large-lot shippers in less densely populated areas and
shippers of raw materials are in the second situation.
The Commission, preoccupied with existing law and perhaps sensitive
to the very large segments of the economy which benefit by it, has
found that value-of-service rates cannot be retained without new
regulation to restrain competition, and thus has recommended that
the agricultural and bulk-shipment exemptions be repealed.63 Thus,
6172Stat. 572 (1958); 49 Usc Sec. 15 (a) (3).
62U.S.v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R. Co., 372 Us 744 (1963).
See statement and testimony of Commissioner Howard Freas before the
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce. (Hearings on Problems of the Railroads. Part 2, pp. 1830—183],
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it is evident that the Commission is persuaded that in order to check the
drain on common carriage more restrictions must be placed on non-
regulated carriage. Only in this way can a rate structure which contains
massive elements of internal subsidy be sustained.
Political realities, however, make the prospects of such legislation
remote. The geographic diffusion of the population and the diverse
economic bases of many states and regions have diminished the
political appeal of legislation to secure the low-cost movement of basic
raw materials over long distances. Moreover, Americans generally have
displayed a marked intolerance of efforts to interfere with their private
and often free use of waterways and highways.
The Administration's proposals to admit greater competition in
transportation would obviously chop down the size of the internal
subsidy by reducing the degree of discrimination in rates.However,
line-haul transportation by rail is still "naturally" monopolistic and
will become more so with automation. Highway transportation may
reach the point of such utter congestion that its provision will become
a public utility function.64 Even today, it is likely that for volume
shipments there is a substantial spread between rail and highways costs,
which would permit considerable discrimination to flourish.
Thus it is by no means certain that freer competition in transportation
will eliminate monopolistic practices. On this score the program for
less regulation has come under attack.
Continuance of regulation does not mean, however, that the full
panoply of regulatory restraints should be retained. A decision to
discard the discriminatory rate structure as a means of achieving public
objectives might lead to more fruitful ways of blending private enter-
prise and public goals in transportation. The abandonment of price
discrimination as a public policy should allow distinctions to be drawn
between those elements of transportation service which are of a public
utility nature and those which may be effectively controlled by market
competition.
The provision of right of way, both rail and highway is, in the main,
a public utility function as is, to a lesser extent, the provision of motive
power. On the other hand, neither the public nor private costs of
providing freight cars, trailers, or containers, and the provision of
freight consolidation and routing service are so rigid that effective
"Our notion here is that there may be public costs associated with unlimited
entry into the trucking business, which may call for at least some limitation of the
number of firms allowed to operate trucks over the road. Whether this calls for
continued rate regulation is doubtful—but a possibility.372 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
competition in the supply of equipment and service is not possible.65
These functions would be removed from the sphere of rate regulation
if regulation were really to be focused on monopoly and not on the
transfer of benefits from one portion of the economy to another.
(Many of these services are already being performed by shippers
themselves, and it would appear that this will continue in the future.)
It is probable that a freeing up of large parts of the business of trans-
portation would lead to the development of new ideas, techniques,
and transport institutions.
This is not to say, however, that all discrimination can or will be
eliminated from the structure of freight rates.In the past, public
acceptance of discrimination among classes of goods and for certain
movements favored some shippers and penalized others.For the
future, we may expect public insistence on some measure of discrimi-
nation which will equalize the price of transport for similar movements,
even though the costs of these movements may differ. Public
of a far-flung rail network, of mileage scales in rate structures, of a
ubiquitous highway system, and of local-service airlines has provided
evidence that there is general unwillingness to impose the full economic
penalty on those who are unfavorably located.It is probably realistic
to anticipate that this will continue. Transportation history indicates
that the public's conception of what is fair and equitable transportation
pricing is not based on the specifics of cost and demand. (The long-
standing quarrel over the long- and short-haul problem is evidence of
this.) Until technology overcomes differences in cost which are related
to traffic density, climate, terrain, distance, etc., some measure of
discrimination will likely be demanded by the public. If history is any
guide, this discrimination will be accommodated, at least in part,
through the price structure of regulated common carriers.
Conclusions
Clearly, the transportation system of the United States has been the
means by which public policy has sought to promote the welfare of
certain sectors of the economy. A dominant theme in regulation has
For example, we can see how stripping away the nonpublic-utility elements
from theratestructure would affect rates by examining rates under Plans III and
IV piggyback. There, the rates are essentially mileage charges for locomotive power
on rail rights of way. The lease costs of both trailers and flatcars are presently
outside the scope of regulation. Whether they remain so will depend on the Com-
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been the maintenance of low rates on basic raw materials produced in
areas more or less remote from the major consuming markets. The
effect of this policy on the distribution of income in the United States
has undoubtedly been enormous though largely immeasurable. It may
be surmised that in the extractive industries, many of which have
tended to be competitive, one of the effects of value-of-service rates
has been to increase land rent.Insofar as this has occurred in the
less-densely populated areas of the country, the result has probably
been a narrowing of the differences between the values of rural and
urban land. At the other end of the rate spectrum, value-of-service
rates have probably imposed a larger share of the transportation
burden on shippers of high-rated commodities, mainly manufactured
goods, and this may have tended to dilute the quasi-rents associated
with the less than perfectly competitive nature of some manufac-
turing.
While this may describe the effect of the internal subsidy on rail
rates, it has played a different role in truck transportation. Here, value-
of-service rates have probably had a marked impact on the growth of
towns and smaller cities off main rail routes and on the periphery of metro-
politan areas. The existence of ubiquitous truck transportation may have
contributed greatlytotheindustrial and populationdecentrali-
zation which has occurred in many metropolitan areas since World
War II.
Whatever may have been the exact results of value-of-service pricing,
they have not been the product of aimless legislation. There is a clear
and relatively consistent pattern of legislative and administrative action
regarding surface transportation. The preservation of discriminating
rates administered by and through the regulated common carrier
system has been the dominant policy underlying transportation regu-
lation in the United States for many years.This policy has been
pursued because of the legislative expectation that it could stimulate a
pattern of resource allocation and economic development desired by
many members of Congress. The desire to curb monopoly power in
transportation has been of marginal significance to Congress through-
out the past four decades. The evidence supporting these conclusions is
scattered through the record of Congressional action on transportation
matters. No other interpretation is so consistent with Commission
policies. One must be impressed upon reading the Congressional Record
that Congress is willing to "skin the cat" in a variety of ways.
The problem for Congress and the nation is that increasing com-
petition in transportation has made the enforcement of value-of-service374 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
rates virtually impossible.66 The "preservation of the common carrier
system" in its present form has depended on a coalescence of interests
which is gradually breaking down. The interests of the various carriers
in continued regulation are obviously different.Similarly, shippers
of freight are split into different camps because of the effects regulation
has on them. That shippers are not neutral in the struggle between the
different modes compounds the problem of resolving the split between
the truckers and the rail carriers, and makes uncertain the prospect
that regulation will be abandoned. Moreover, it is clear that transport
markets are still pock-marked by important elements of monopoly.
The result of forces working in transportation today, such as private
transportation, experimental rates which deflate the discriminatory
structure, and shipper demands for specialized equipment, may den-
igrate the effect of regulation.Perhaps Congress would be wise to
recast regulation with a recognition that, while its objectives may need
change, some measure of its protections to the public must be retained.
COMMENT
D. F. PEGRUM, University of California at Los Angeles
Because I wish to draw attention to a number of problems that cover
a rather wide range of subjects it will not be possible to explore any of
them in depth.I shall try, however, to make the nature of the issues
66Itmay be that, even without legislative action, the value-of-service concept will
be laid to rest. The Federal District Court in New Haven, Conn., recently rendered
an opinion on this subject which may be the harbinger of such a development.
(See N.Y., N.H., and H. R.R. Co. ela!.U.S.and ICC District Court (3 judge), Conn.,
Civil Action 9229, 7/23/63. Noted in 32 U.S. LawWeek, p.2081.)
The court struck down an ICC order which had found unlawful an all-freight rate
plan proposed by the New Haven and competing roads. The Commission had
found the proposed rates to violate the classification principle stated in Sec. 1(6) of
the Commerce Act. The court rejected this interpretation. Judge Smith made this
observation on the matter:"It would appear that the Commission here invokes
Sec. 1(6) as a means of preserving a basis for the 'value of service' concept in rate-
making. .. ina desire to hold fast to a past which has already slipped away
beyond our reach.
"This 'value of service' principle was useful in the early years of the Interstate
Commerce Act in requiring the more prosperous East to assist in the development of
railroads and commercial and agricultural enterprises in the undeveloped West at a
time when the existing railroads were powerful monopolies.
The continued application of this principle is, however, contrary to the letter and
spirit of the National Transportation Policy amendment to the Interstate Commerce
Act, ...which,as its legislative history makes clear, was intended to permit the
railroads, no longer effective monopolies, to respond to competition by asserting
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clear, hopefully to force a recognition of their significance, and to
encourage further discussion of them.
The Common Carrier in the Transport System
The common carrier system has never been universal in carriage for hire.
Other enterprises have always participated extensively in transport. The
obligations of common carriage are to serve all alike, at reasonable prices
and without discrimination. That is to say, within the scope of their
common carrier duties the firms cannot select their customers and they
cannot include or exclude through the device of discriminatory pricing.
Whatever the reasons for the emergence and development of the
common carrier concept, it is clear that with the rise of the railroad
to its position of dominance, the idea of protecting the shipper from
monopolistic exploitation became of paramount significance.With
the failure of competition to play the role that it was assumed to be
capable of under laissez-faire, and with the growth of regulation, the
need for limiting competition among the railroads also became recog-
nized. It should be noted, however, that common carriage by agencies
other than railroads, water for example, was performed by com-
petitive and nonregulated enterprises.
The development of transport regulation around the railroads,
together with the accompanying comprehensive and detailed rules for
common carriage under federal legislation, has resulted in an identi-
fication of the common carrier with regulation. This identification has
led to the assumption that all common carriers must be regulated in the
public utility mold and that entry must be restricted.
Railroad regulation came to encompass a detailed regulation of
prices (rates) and also made the railroads total common carriers.
Finally, in 1920, limitations were imposed on freedom of entry.In
the legislation which followed 1920 these controls were extended to all
common carriage in this country, except that firms engaged in common
carriage by water, motor, and air were not restricted solely to that
type of transport activity.
None of the foregoing conditions is essential to the status of the
common carrier per Se,andthe idea of common carriage should not be
identified with rate regulation and freedom of entry. if this is so, then
it may be asked: what would be left of the common carrier if rate
regulations were abandoned? Common carrier obligations to shippers
would remain as under present law, and this seems to be the most
pressing need. Appropriate authority and agencies for specifying and
enforcing obligations would be retained; readiness to serve all alike376 THE COMMON CARRIER UNDER MODERN CONDITIONS
would remain. These duties would relate to services rather than firms
or enterprises, and would not necessarily preclude any carrier from
engaging in noncommon carrier transport.Relaxation or even the
abandonment of current regulation, therefore, would not necessarily
result in the elimination or disappearance of the common carrier.
Freedom of Entry and the Common Carrier
Freedom of entry as a privilege to be extended to common carriers
would have different effects depending on the mode of transport. For
the railroads, freedom of entry in the form of new railroad lines and
extensions into the territory of others, hardly seems to be feasible.
For air transport, it is complicated by the problems of subsidy and
airmail payments. Restriction of entry, particularly in feeder or local
service, is justified because of this.Restrictions on the operations of
the trunk lines may possibly be supported on similar grounds. The
administration of policy to date, however, does not seem to have en-
couraged outstanding efficiency, particularly on those lines where
one has the greatest reason to expect it.
Freedom of entry in motor and water carriage involves somewhat
different considerations than those which apply to the other two modes.
The reasons for restricting entry as a means of limiting competition
are not apparent. Freedom of entry for carriers in these agencies need
not result in the abandonment of common carrier obligations.Cer-
tification of those wishing to serve as common carriers could be re-
tained. Contract carriage could be restricted to certain types of service
if it were so desired. Guarantee of being fit, willing, and able could
be retained, as well as publication of and abidance by rates, notice
of changes of rates and services, and permission to abandon.If cus-
tomers want common carrier service it is difficult to believe that they
will be unwilling to pay for it, or that they should be compelled to do
so if they do not.
In short, not only is the competitive process completely compatible
with the common carrier as such, it has existed in the past, and stilt
does exist over an appreciable range of transportation.
Freedom of Entry and Intermodal Ownershiv
Freedom of entry means the freedom of undertakings to enter a
particular line of transport without restrictions designed to protect
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This still leaves open the question, however, of who should be free
to enter. Should the railroads be given a free hand to enter any of the
other modes of transport? Should shipping companies be given a
free hand to engage in domestic and overseas air transport? Should
aircraft manufacturers be permitted to enter
theautomobile manufacturers to enter the motor carrier for hire
service? Complete or undefined freedom of entry would require an
affirmative answer to these questions. A negative answer, however,
would not necessarily imply a limitation on competition, but rather a
limitation on who the new entrants or competitors might be.
Freedom of entry in this context raises two broad questions of
public policy:(I) the theory of industrial organization compatible
with a competitive private enterprise economy; and (2) the underlying
theory of organization of a national transportation system geared to an
economical utilization of resources devoted to transportation.
The implications of the first question cannot be developed here.
Suffice it to say that the application of the antitrust laws to market
dominance, diversification of corporate activities, and corporate ag-
glomeration constitute areas of debate where opinions differ widely
and consensus of opinion is notably difficult to obtain.There is
obviously pretty general agreement, however, that some rules are
necessary and that some limitations do have to be imposed, although
the nature of these are vague and the lines of demarcation rather
dimly perceptible.
The second question needs to be evaluated in the light of two major
considerations in transport organization:(1) consolidation policy,
particularly with regard to railroads; and (2) the policy to be followed
on diversification or integration of the various modes or agencies.
The consolidation issue comes first, it seems to me, because views
on diversification will be influenced in a vital way by the policy adopted
for consolidation. The limitations on competition among railroads,
which are the result of economic characteristics derived from the
technology of this mode of transport, have given rise to the special
issue of railroad consolidation.This focuses on the plan or policy
to be followed that is consonant with private enterprise, competition,
and an efficient transportation system. There are three possibilities:
(I) the grouping of railroads so as to maintain very extensive com-
petition; (2) a national, four-system plan, or something of that nature;
and (3) regional consolidation, with each system enjoying extensive
monopoly of rail transport in the area it serves.It is most likely that any
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features with definite limitations on the geographic areas served by each
railroad. Resolution, therefore, of the problem of consolidation must
shape judgment on the appropriate policy regarding diversification,
because of the inescapable blending of technological and regional
monopoly with thoroughgoing and regionally unconstrained com-
petition.
Diversification or integration relates to policy centering on the
question of whether the formation of transportation companies should
be permitted. We can therefore omit discussion of entry of one mode
into another to supply ancillary services.
The desirability of new transportation companies must be considered
in terms of their possible impact on competition, efficiency, and reg-
ulation.It is not readily apparent to me that the formation of such
companies would of itself enhance competition in the rendering of
transport services.I do not see how it could improve competition in
motor, water, and air transport. Nor can I see any ready or necessary
improvements in coordination; on the contrary, the possibility of the
opposite is very real.Furthermore, if consolidation results in a few
giant rail lines and a large amount of regional monopoly, extensive
diversification would. result in a highly oligopolistic transport structure,
with a real threat of limitations on competition, and the dangers of
"internal" subsidies. Second, economies of scale in rail transport have
been the subject of some rather careful study recently. The results
seem to indicate definite limitations on economical size.If this is so,
it is difficult to see how diversification would do anything but aggravate
the situation.Third, diversification and the formation of transpor-
tation companies would probably result in more rather than less
regulation. This contradicts proposals favoring a reduction in public
controls.
The Problem of Discrimination
—Its New Relevance
The problem of discrimination is noteworthy in connection with this
discussion because of its bearing on competition and regulation, and
because of R. A. Nelson's rather extensive attention to it.
Discrimination in economic theory refers to price differentiation
among homogeneous products resulting from a producer's ability to
separate his markets. The applicability of the concept to multiproduct
firms with nontraceable costs is anything but simple or clear.The
railroads, in particular, have significant amounts of nontraceable costs.
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very clear agreement on what constitutes a unit of output nor how to
designate the particular products.
Nevertheless, agreement on the fact that there are nontraceable costs
means that the precise total cost of each of the various services cannot
be derived. This in turn means that the market (or "value of service")
must be used in the making of rates if efficient utilization of the re-
sources is to be achieved.
It seems to me that there will be no discrimination in the economic
sense as long as price differences represent the recovery of nontraceable
costs, and there will be no "internal subsidy" as long as any rate com-
pletely covers the costs which are directly attributable and traceable
to the services which are being rendered.